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The rise of supermarket in developing countries has important implications 
for the agricultural system in these countries. To lessen the intense price 
competition in retail markets, supermarkets have introduced private food 
standards. While the literature has pointed out the additional financial 
burden for producers, associated with the introduction of supermarket 
standards, it has ignored its positive demand effects. This paper examines 
the relationship between downstream product competition and upstream 
credit access for agricultural producers. In doing so, the analysis shows that 
as long as there is coexistence of the supermarket and domestic marketing 
system the entry of supermarket should broaden the financial opportunities 
of the agricultural producers. 
1. Introduction   
Before 1990, the development of supermarkets was very slow in developing 
countries, since it was only supported by local capital. Then saturation and 
intense competition in developed countries retail markets and much higher 
margins to be made by investing in developing markets have fostered 
investment by European, U.S., and Japanese supermarket chains. For 
instance, Carrefour earned three times higher margins on average in 
Argentina compared to its French operations in the 1990s (Reardon et al., 
2003). In addition urbanization, with the consequent entry of women into 
the workforce, has contributed to and favored the spread of supermarket in 
developing countries (for details see Trail, 2006). 
This recent phenomenon implies that supermarkets will increasingly 
and already do influence the structure and conditions of the agri-food 
system in developing countries. For example, Reardon and Berdegue (2002) 
calculate that supermarkets in Latin America buy 2.5 times more fruits and 
vegetables from local producers than all the exports of produce from Latin 
America to the rest of the world. Similarly, Okado (2001) reports that 
supermarkets in Kenya already buy three times the volume of produce that 
is bought by the export market. 
As supermarkets increasingly dominate food retail, they will 
determine the conditions, and the potential for small farms and firms to sell 
agri-food products. In particular recent food scares have spurred the 
development of supermarket private standards that promote the safety of 
their products to avoid food safety scandals. Such incentive has been 
reinforced by rapid concentration on the retail side, since these private 
standards introduce differentiation of the food products and thereby lessen 
the price competition. Therefore, supermarkets have an increasing influence 
  1on developing countries, not only through their investments, but also 
through the imposition of their private standards (Reardon and Farina, 2002, 
Reardon and Berdegué, 2002, Boselie et al., 2003; Fernando et al., 2003 and 
Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003). To understand the impact of the 
supermarket on farmers in developing countries, the implications of the 
introduction of higher food standards cannot be ignored. 
Developing countries often lack in the financial and technical 
capacity to implement and enforce such standard. As Boselie (2002) shows 
in the case of Ahold for fresh produce in Thailand, compared with the North 
American or the European market, produce marketing in these regions is 
characterized by poor institutional and public physical infrastructure 
support. Private infrastructure, such as packing houses, cold chains, and 
shipping equipment among suppliers and distributors is usually inadequate. 
In this perspective supermarket investment presents an opportunity 
for developing countries. Since it can substitute to public investment and 
foster the development of a marketing channel for higher food standard 
products. Such marketing channel can extend the size of the market to 
consumer willing to pay for higher quality food products; which in turn can 
increase the return on investment in agricultural production and provide 
better opportunities for farmers. 
However, to meet the requirements of the supermarket an upfront 
investment is often required by farmers. This investment can range from 
upgrading management skills to new equipment purchase to establishment 
of quality control and coordination systems. Such investment costs can be 
very substantial relative to the means of small firms, and can force their exit 
or their movement to a less profitable market. A growing body of literature 
suggests that small producers can face considerable difficulties meeting the 
requirements of supermarkets (see for instance Dolan Humphrey, 2000 and 
Dolan, Humphrey, Harris-Pascal, 2001). 
The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of supermarket 
entry on the access to credit by farmers. In this paper, survival of 
downstream producers hinge on their access to external financial sources of 
funding. In developing economies credit market are often plagued by moral 
hazard and broader access to credit constitutes a focal target of development 
policies. 
In this paper production is characterized by two sectors: a domestic 
and a supermarket retailing sector. Each sector has its own procurement 
system as well as its own food standard. While the supermarket has 
developed a private standard the domestic retailer follows the public 
standard set by the domestic authority.  
To supply either sector, farmers need external financial capacity to 
finance production. The credit market is model a la Holmstrom and Tirole 
(1997). Such investment can be founded by three sources: domestic 
institution such as bank, informal moneylenders and the supermarket itself. 
  2Finally, downstream, the supermarket's marketing strategy is that 
selling higher quality produce compensates for the higher prices. Standards 
then become crucial to differentiate the supermarkets' product from that of 
the local markets. To capture this fact on the downstream market 
heterogeneous consumer in term of preference make their purchasing 
decision observing the nature and the price of the products supplied. 
The paper is organized as follow. The first section presents the 
model. The next section analyses the financing of farmers. The third section 
examines the implication of the supermarket entry on the market structure. 
Then in a next section, based on the established results, the impact of the 
emergence of higher food standards is explicitly determined. The last 
section concludes the article. 
2.  Presentation of the model 
Production requires a fixed investment I  and farmers are financially 
constrained. Their level of finance, denoted by  A, is assumed to be 
uniformly distributed between 0 and  A  , where  0 > A  denotes the level of 
finance of the wealthiest farm. Furthermore, for tractability, farmers 
produce at most one unit of agricultural product. Farmers have the choice 
between two projects: 
-  The domestic retailer project. The domestic retailer 
represents local retail shops. The products sold by this 
domestic retailer follow the country food standards,  d α , 
that are set by a public agency. The probability of success 
of a diligent farmer in meeting the public requirement is 
 while the opportunity cost of effort is increasing with 
the stringency of the food standard and is given by 
, H p
B d α  . 
The overall return of the domestic retailer project is  .  d R
-  The supermarket project. The supermarket follows its 
own private standard,  s α  which is assumed greater than the 
public food standard. Hence, the opportunity cost of effort 
for farmers is increased to  B s α  , but it is assumed that the 
probability of success for farmers when exerting effort 
remains the same. In addition, to comply with the 
supermarket requirements, an upfront investment   in 
infrastructure is necessary. Indeed, the supermarket usually 
imposes substantial investments, such as irrigation 
systems, greenhouses, trucks, cooling sheds and packing 
technologies, among other things. Finally, the overall 
return of the supermarket project is  . 
C
s R
Although the supermarket may finance a fraction of its project, for 
tractability, it is assumed that both projects are directly financed by the 
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2. To make the problem interesting, farmers are protected by limited 
liability and diligence by farmers is socially desirable. 
In the downstream market heterogeneous consumers in terms of 
preferences make their purchasing decision observing the price and nature 
of the products (i.e. public/supermarket private standard). Consumers are 
modeled in the spirit of Mussa and Rosen (1978) and we denote by θ  the 
consumer differentiating attribute. For tractability, this attribute is assumed 
to be uniformly distributed between   and each consumer purchases at 
most one unit of the good. Thus, 
] , 0 [ M
M  also denotes the maximum market size. 
The utility of consumers with the differentiating attribute θ  is given by 
 
otherwise.
retailer,   domestic    the from   purchased   if
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For tractability, the marginal cost of producing one unit of agricultural 
products is normalized to zero. Thus, the project return,   and  , also 
denotes the per unit retail price charged by the supermarket and the 
domestic retailer, respectively. Based on expression (1), the demand for the 
domestic retailer product is 
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On the other hand, the quantity demanded for the supermarket product can 
be expressed as 
 
otherwise.



























  (3) 
Note that because the supermarket and domestic retailer products are 
assumed to be vertically differentiated, to insure the coexistence of both 
markets, it is necessary to have Rs>Rd . 
Before concluding this section, it is interesting to note that  θ / 1  can 
be interpreted as the marginal utility of income (Tirole, 1988). As reported 
in the literature (see for instance Reardon et al. 2003 and Trail, 2006), with 
urbanization, the emergence of a wealthier social class is a major 
determinant of the diffusion of supermarkets in developing countries. The 
current framework captures the fact that consumers with the lowest 
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Veyssiere (2007).  
  4marginal utility of income (i.e. the highest θ ) are more eager to consume 
the supermarket food products. 
3  Financing of farmers 
Financing is modeled in fashion similar in spirit to Holmstrom and Tirole 
(1997). As explained in this section, the proper implementation of the 
project requires that all agents be provided with adequate incentives. In 
particular, the contract design problem consists in optimally sharing the 
project return, among the contracting parties. The optimal sharing rule 
should be such that it guarantees the participation of all agents without 
destroying incentives for diligent behavior. 
Supermarket project.  
The supermarket project involves three agents: the farmers, the 
supermarket and the bank. The return of the supermarket project has to be 
shared, such that 
. s l f s R R R π + + =  
Here,  s π  denotes the rent of the supermarket, while   and   denotes the 
rent of the farmers and the lenders. 
f R l R
Farmer incentive compatibility constraint 
To guarantee proper effort by the farmer, he should be provided at least as 
much while exerting effort as when shirking i.e. 
B R p s f H α ≥ . 
The bank participation constraint: The banking sector is assumed 
perfectly competitive and in order to accept a loan application, the bank 
should at least break-even. The break-even condition is expressed as: 
( ) , A C I R R p s f s H − + ≥ − − π  
or equivalently, 
 
. s H s H s s R p p B C I A A − + + + = ≥ π α   (4) 
 
Recall that C  denotes the necessary upfront investment to produce 
supermarket products. It is important to understand that according to (4) 
sole the farmers that can justify of a level of collateral   will be 
financed by the bank to supply the supermarket.  
s A A ≥
Supermarket participation constraint 
Finally for the supermarket to be willing to develop the project, it 
should be that: 
. 0 > s H p π  
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Farmers who were not granted credit to supply the supermarket, can 
still supply the domestic retailer. The domestic retailer project also involves 
three agents: the farmers, the domestic retailer and the bank. The return of 
the project has to be shared, such that 
. d l f d R R R π + + =  
Here,  d π  denotes the rent of the domestic retailer.  
Farmer incentive compatibility constraint 
Again, to guarantee proper effort by the farmer, he should be provided at 
least as much while exerting effort than when shirking i.e. 
B R p d f H α ≥ . 
The bank participation constraint:  
As before, to be granted financing for the domestic retailer project, the 
farmer's level of finance has to be such that 
. d H d H d d R p p B I A A − + + = ≥ π α   (5) 
Therefore farmers with finance such that  d A A <   will have no access to 
funding and are left credit constrained.  
Domestic retailer participation constraint 
Finally to guarantee the participation of the domestic retailer it should be 
that: 
. 0 > d H p π  
The following proposition summarizes our results.  
Proposition 1 (Market segmentation).  Assuming coexistence of both 
marketing channels - domestic retailer and supermarket- the financial 
contract passed between farmers, the bank, the domestic retailer and the 
supermarket is as follows: 
-  when  Ā ≥ A ≥ As , farmers borrow from the bank and 
supply the supermarket procurement system, 
-  when  As ≥ A ≥ Ad  , farmers borrow from the bank and 
supply the domestic retailer procurement system, 
-  when  A ≤ Ad  , farmers have no access to credit and are 
excluded from the marketing systems. 
Furthermore, the expected rent of the supermarket can be expressed as 
pHs  pHRs  Rs − Rd
s − d − I − Ā − C − sB− M,  
 
while domestic retailer expected rent is given by 
pHd  pH  1
d Rd − dB− I − Ā − M.
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one unit, the number of farmers who supply the supermarket also denotes 
the total quantity supplied by the supermarket. This quantity is given by 
Ss  Ā − As,  
or using (4), 
Ss  pHRs − I − Ā − C − sB− pHs.
  (6) 
When   farmers do not receive funding to supply the supermarket 
marketing channel. However, they can still receive funding to supply the 
domestic retailer as long as  . Thus, with the entry of the supermarket, 
the total quantity supplied to the domestic retailer becomes 
s A A≤
d A A ≥
Sd  As − Ad,  
or using (5), 
Sd  pHRd − pHRs  C  s − dB pHs − pHd.   (7) 
At equilibrium, both the market for the domestic retailer and for the 
supermarket products clear, such that  d d S D =  and  s s S D = . Substituting 
back the demand expressions (equations (2) and (3)) into the respective 
supply equations (equations (6) and (7)), the expected rent of the 
supermarket is expressed as 
pHs  pHRs  Rs − Rd
s − d − I − Ā − C − sB− M,
  (8) 
while domestic retailer expected rent is given by: 
pHd  pH  1
d Rd − dB− I − Ā − M.
  (9) 
The empirical literature describing the emergence of supermarkets in 
developing countries has forcefully argued that supermarkets tend to 
contract with large, wealthy farmers, while poor ones are left behind. Our 
model underlies the simple logic behind these observations: supermarkets 
set up high standards that often require substantial investment on the part of 
farmers. Thus, only wealthy farmers are able to finance the upfront 
investment, while poorer ones are credit-rationed and will, as such, turn to 
the traditional segment. 
Furthermore, this literature has also emphasized that the domestic 
retailing sector is often jeopardized by the entry of supermarket. The 
supermarket private standards are in general more stringent than public 
standard and fierce competition by the supermarket can drives out domestic 
retailers. For example, following the emergence of supermarket 64,198 
small shops went out of business in Argentina from 1984 to 1993, and 5240 
  7small shops closed their doors in Chile from 1991 to 1995 (Reardon et al., 
2003). 
 Lemma 1. Let define  ( ) [ ]
1 +




M A I B R α
α α  as the minimum retail price that can 
be charged by the domestic retailer. With the entry of the supermarket, the 
domestic retailing sector is not jeopardized, as long as,  R Rd >  . 
 Proof The proof is straightforward from equation (9). 
 
According to Lemma 1, the survival of the domestic retailing sector 
is contingent on the domestic project's return, which ultimately depends on 
the equilibrium price. Therefore, to assert the impact of supermarket entry, 
it is necessary to determine the effects of the supermarket entry on retail 
prices. The next section studies this question. 
4.  Market structure and projects’ return  




α > ), first note 
that given equations (2) and (3), the supermarket project' return can be 
written as 
. s s d d s s D D M R α α α − − =   (10) 
Similarly, for the domestic retailer, it corresponds to 
. s d d d d d D D M R α α α − − =   (11) 
Thus, the size of the market, as well as consumer preference for each 
product, determines the returns for each project. Furthermore, while the 
supermarket is assumed to behave as a monopolist, the domestic retailing 
sector is composed of symmetric retailing shops. The problem for a retail 








dM − Dd − Dsdd.
 
Here,   denotes the quantity sold by a single retail shop. The first order 
condition implies that 
d d











∂ = χ  denotes the conjectural variation elasticity of demand. 
Assuming that there are  N  domestic retailing shops, given that 
,  di
N i



















∂  represents the "conjecture" of 
firm   regarding how firm   will react to an increase in quantity by firm  . 
It can be divided into three classes. Negative values of the conjecture 
indicate adaptive behavior, a zero value may refer to a cournotian behavior 
i j i
  8and positive values denote expectation matching behavior. Assuming that 
individual firms anticipate other firms' behavior, reasonable boundaries for 








d , while under Bertrand conjecture  1
1
− ∂








d  denotes the market share, the conjectural variation elasticity 
will take a value between 0 and 1. The parameter χ  allows an examination 
of various types of strategic interactions among domestic retailing firms. If, 











D  (given that Cournot conjecture imposes 





d ); thereby,  N
1 = χ . Similarly, if the   firms are engaged in price 
competition and have no capacity constraints, 
N
0 = χ  (given that  1
1
− ∂









D ). Obviously,  0 = χ  also captures the perfectly competitive 
outcome. Finally, if the firms collude and act as a monopoly (expectation 
matching behavior),  1 = χ .
3 , 4
Given that the supermarket is assumed to behave as a monopolist, its 
problem is 




and the first order condition is obtained as 
sM − dDd − 2sDs  0.   (13) 
According to equations (12) and (13), the Nash equilibrium quantity of the 














∗   (14) 














∗   (15) 
Substituting equations (14) and (15) into equations (10) and (11), the return 
for the supermarket project can be expressed as 
Rs
∗ 
1  ss − 2ds  dd
21  s − d
M.
  (16) 
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interpretation. For a good review and discussion see Lavoie, 2005.
4While we have assumed that domestic retailing firms are symmetric and hold the same conjecture, 
more generally,   where   denotes the market share of firm i  and  i i
N






∂ = κ  (see, for 
instance, Porter 1983).
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Rd
∗  d
 − 1s  d
21  s − d
M.
  (17) 
It is important to understand that   and   represent equilibrium prices of 
the supermarket and domestic retailer project, respectively. Substituting 
back equations (16) and (17) into (8) and (9) will provide the expected rent 
earned by the supermarket and domestic retailer, respectively, under 





5.  Impact of the supermarket private standard 
Intuitively, more stringent supermarket standards should raise the return of 
the project and thereby raising farmers' credit opportunities. However, as 
explicit in Lemma 1, domestic retailers may be unable to compete with the 
supermarket and as a result driven out of the market. This, in turn, may 
strengthen the credit constraints faced by farmers. 
Based on the previously established results, this section examines the impact 
of differing stringency in the supermarket food standards, on the market 
structure and its implication for supplying farmers. 
 
Proposition 2.  There exists a standard threshold level defined by   
( ) ( )
()( ) () () () [] M A I M p




+ − + + − + − +
+ − + + + ∗ =
χ χ α α χ
α α α α
1 2 1 1 1 2
1   and such that: 
- s ≤ s
∗ , then the market for domestic retailer and supermarket 
products will coexist. In this regime when the stringency of the supermarket 
standard increases, the number of farmers having access to funding 
increases as well. Moreover the existence of the supermarket always 
increases the number of farmers funded, in comparison to a situation where 
there is no supermarket. 
-  s ≥ s
∗ , then with the entry of the supermarket, the market for 
domestic retailer products vanishes. Here, the number of farmers funded 
will decrease as long as the supermarket has a greater degree of market 
power than the domestic retailers. 
 Proof The domestic retailer will participate in marketing activities as long 
as its expected rent is positive (i.e.  0 ≥ d H p π ) Using expression (9), 
0 ≥ d H p π  if 
( ) ( )
()( ) () () () []
.
1 2 1 1 1 2
1
M A I M p
M A I B M p
H d d
d H d
d s s + − + + − + − +
+ − + + +
= ≤
∗
χ χ α α χ
α α
α α α  
Since farmers supply at most one unit, the aggregate equilibrium quantity 
corresponds to the number of farmers funded. Prior to the entry of the 
supermarket, the demand for domestic products is given by 
d
d R
d M D α − = . 
  10Then, the maximizing behavior by the domestic retailing sector implies that 
























given that  
Fc − Fb  1  2s − d  2s  0.  
Thus, under coexistence, the number of farmers funded strictly increases. 









s F  will be lower than   as long as  b F 1 ≠ χ ; in other words, as long as the 
domestic retailer is not a monopolist like the supermarket. 
 
The reasoning behind this proposition is as follows. With the entry 
of the supermarket, to meet its demand, the domestic retailer needs to 
extend credit to smaller producers. According to equation (5), to do so, the 
domestic retailer has to diminish its expected rent. As a result, farmers are 
left with a greater share of the project and more farmers have access to 
funding. However, as the stringency of the supermarket standard increases, 
the domestic project's return decreases (see equation (17). Therefore, the 
rent of the domestic retailer decreases to the point where selling domestic 
products is not a viable option (see Lemma 1). 
However, when the supermarket faces no competition, it will 
maximize its expected rent. To do so, the supermarket will reduce its 
volume of sale and, as a result, farmers will face fewer financing 
opportunities. 
5.  Discussion and concluding remarks 
In this paper, farmers’ credit access is modeled in a framework 
similar in spirit to Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). However, unlike 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) the project returns are endogenously 
determined by the relative stringency of each food standards as well as the 
retailing market structure. This allows to understand the implication of the 
emergence of a marketing system for high quality food products, which is 
  11often associated with the spread of supermarkets in developing countries, on 
farmers credit access.  
According to Proposition 2, a regulator seeking to extend farmers' 
credit access should impose a maximum standard level on the supermarket 
food products, such that the entry of the supermarket does not jeopardize the 
existing domestic retailing sector. 
Nevertheless, it is not clear whether the supermarket has an interest 
in driving out the domestic retailing sector. Given that the presence of the 
lower quality products allows him to charge a higher price for its food 
products than in absence of lower quality products. In a sense the presence 
of the domestic retailing sector allows the supermarket to better discriminate 
among consumers willing to pay for higher food standards. Thus, it may be 
the case that the supermarket prefers to set a standard level below  . In 
that case there is no need to regulate the supermarket food standards. 
∗
s α
Furthermore, if the regulator cannot control the supermarket food 
standard, yet to preserve the domestic retailing sector it may diminish(raise) 
the domestic food standard. A change in stringency of the domestic food 
standards has ambiguous effects on the survival of the domestic retailing 
sector. On the one hand, its reduction will diminish the opportunity cost of 
effort for farmers and thereby the overall cost of production of the domestic 
products. This, in turn, will favor the survival of the domestic retailing 
sector. On the other hand, a reduction in food standards results in a 
reduction in demand for the domestic food products, which will curtail the 
market share of the domestic retailing sector. Whether the cost reduction 
effect dominates the demand effects will determine the best policy for the 
regulator. In some countries, evidence suggests that the demand effect 
outweighs the raise in cost of production implied by more stringent food 
standards (see for instance, Reardon and Farina, 2002 and Reardon and 
Berdegué, 2002). For instance as reported by Reardon and Berdegué (2002), 
in South America, in response to the entry of supermarkets, domestic 
retailers have raised the stringency of their food standards. 
Therefore our results suggest that the entry of supermarkets in 
developing may extend farmers credit access, via the emergence of a 
marketing channel for food products with more stringent standard.  
Finally, while this paper focuses on one trait of the supermarket 
organization, its ability to set higher food standards, the supermarket is 
defined by other characteristics. In particular the empirical literature reports 
that the supermarket procurement organization not only provides extension 
services to farmers, but also additional funding via inputs loans. Marcoul 
and Veyssiere (2007) using a similar framework of analysis shows that such 
organization of procurement may also be conducive of better financing 
opportunities for farmers.  
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